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This paper investigates the possible non-linear effect of corruption on human capital 
accumulation through two channels. The first channel is through the effect of corruption 
on the public expenditure on education and the second channel is through the effect of 
corruption on the physical capital investment. Initially, we construct an endogenous two-
sector growth model with human capital accumulation and we try to explore the impact 
of corruption on the allocation of public expenditure and therefore on the distribution of 
human capital across sectors. Then by using a semi-parametric method, we confirm the 
presence of non-linearities between human capital and corruption. 
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1  Introduction 
The topic of corruption has received recently a lot of attention in the economic literature, with 
some recent surveys on the topic by Svensson (2005), Aidt (2009) and Campos et al. (2010). 
Corruption is closely related with rent-seeking behavior and the misallocation of talent. 
According to Murphy et al. (1991), Murphy and Vishny (1993) and Acemoglu and Verdier 
(1998) in the presence of corruption, investment in the more innovative sectors of the 
economy is less profitable due to higher transaction costs and this reduces the incentives for 
investment in R&D.  Furthermore, due to corruption there is misallocation of public resources 
and in general public expenditures are less efficient, something that may also lead to a 
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reduction of investment in physical capital. All the previous arguments shape the general 
framework which emphasizes the negative effect of corruption on economic growth. In this 
context important empirical contributions on this area are among others Mauro (1995), 
Mironov (2005) and Mo (2001). Moreover, McAdam and Rummel (2004) by using non-
parametric methods, identify that corruption is highly persistent and that anti-corruption 
policy should be of a paramount importance. However, there are also arguments supporting 
the idea that corruption can have a positive effect on economic growth.1 
The theoretical literature of the corruption and economic growth nexus is very rich. Some 
papers in that context are that of Sarte (2000), who analyses the effect of bureaucratic 
corruption on growth. Mauro (2004) shows that the higher the size of corruption the harder it 
is to eliminate corruption form an economy. A theoretical growth paper with endogenous 
corruption worth mentioning is that of Barreto (2000), who finds in a neoclassical framework 
that corruption mainly redistributes income and that this does not necessarily hurt the 
economy. Blackburn et al. (2006) and Blackburn (2011) show that corruption negatively 
affects growth because public resources are used in detection mechanisms for corruption 
reduction and are not used directly for investment in physical capital. Moreover, corruption 
reduces the quality of public goods. 
On an important separate dimension, the evidence at the macro level concerning the role 
of human capital on economic growth is ambiguous. In studies, such as Barro (1991), Bils 
and Klenow (2000) and Mankiw et al. (1992), there exists clear positive effect of human 
capital on the growth of output (GDP). In other studies however, such as Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994), Islam (1995), and Lau et al. (1991), human capital has a negligible 
contribution to economic growth.  Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001), using non-parametric 
techniques, were among the first to search empirically for a non-linear effect of human capital 
accumulation on economic growth. In our paper, we follow a similar strategy as in 
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001), since we establish the existence of non-linear effects of corruption 
on important components of the formation of human capital accumulation and, hence, 
economic growth.  
Most of the theoretical literature focuses on the impact of corruption on both physical 
capital investment and misallocation of public expenditure, but not in their subsequent impact 
on human capital accumulation. One important theoretical paper which takes into account the 
                                                 
1 The papers, which support the optimistic view of corruption, consider corruption as a mechanism 
which increases efficiency in countries where institutions are not functioning well due to high red tape 
by reducing barriers for new firms. Recent papers on this direction are those of Aidt et al. (2008) and 
Ebben and Vaal (2011). Some older papers that are making similar arguments are Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968).  
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effect of corruption on human capital accumulation is that of Ehrlich and Lui (1999). They 
suggest that corruption affects negatively human capital because more time is invested in 
political capital to improve the bureaucratic power of individuals than on productive 
education sector. Pecorino (1992) investigates the impact of rent seeking on economic growth 
in a model with human capital accumulation. Empirical papers of Devarajan et al. (1996) and 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) justify empirically that public spending on sectors different from 
education has more positive impact on growth. That may be due to the fact that there may be 
already too much public investment on education and its marginal effect in that case would be 
small, or because of the presence of corruption in the education sector. However, in contrast 
to our model, they do not use human capital accumulation and do not check for the impact of 
corruption in the allocation of government spending.  
The current paper in a simple model with exogenous corruption tries to suggest and check 
empirically the notion that corruption affects human capital accumulation, differently through 
different paths, and therefore long run growth.2 Corruption affects two important components 
of human capital: public expenditure devoted to education and the investment on physical 
capital. The two previous components in turn affect the decision on how much to invest in per 
capita human capital. The two forces shape the final total effect of corruption on the 
economy, through human capital accumulation. Therefore corruption and human capital 
accumulation appear to constitute a non-linear relationship. In this context very little attention 
has been given to the effect of corruption on human capital accumulation.3  
The contribution of our paper is that we make two hypotheses on the formation of human 
capital: firstly, the allocation of public expenditure among different sectors affects the fraction 
of human capital that is distributed between final output sector and education sector and 
secondly we assume that the growth rate of physical capital affects negatively human capital 
accumulation.4 Furthermore, we check empirically our specification of human capital and we 
uncover a non-linear effect of corruption on the two determinants of human capital: public 
expenditure on education and growth rate of physical capital. 
                                                 
2 Corruption is considered as an exogenous variable in the present study. More specifically, bureaucrats 
do not appear explicitly in the model. What appears however is the result of bureaucrats’ actions which 
is a specific amount of stolen public resources. 
3 One of the very few attempts is the paper of Rogers (2008) who uses standard OLS regression 
methods and he investigates the direct effect of corruption on human capital.  
4 According to Aghion and Howitt (2007), technological progress should be distinguished from the 
physical capital investment. The physical capital investment is just an increase of the physical capital in 
terms of quantity not of quality. Therefore, the main implication of this assumption is that if more 
physical capital investment happens then it would be a higher demand for workers with medium or 
lower level of education which can lead into a runway of individuals from the education system.   
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Empirically, we try to investigate the presence of non-linear effects of corruption on the 
two components of human capital. To carry out our empirical analysis we use semi-
parametric methods which provide the required flexibility at the empirical level. Our results, 
suggest that public expenditures due to the presence of corruption have a positive but 
declining effect on human capital accumulation. This may be due to the fact that either 
corruption cannot distort at the same level the effect of public expenditures on education as it 
does in other sectors or that because of corruption individuals have an incentive to accumulate 
more human capital. Furthermore, corruption is detrimental to human capital mainly through 
the deterioration of physical capital investment, and it seems obvious that the negative effect 
of corruption through physical capital dominates any possible positive effect through public 
expenditure on education.5 
In section 2 we provide the theoretical model. In section 3 we provide the analytical 
framework needed for the empirical part and in section 4 we provide both a brief exposition 
of the econometric methods and the empirical results. Finally, in section 5 we conclude. 
2.  Theoretical Model  
2.1 Set up of The Model 
The model is a two sector growth model with endogenous human capital accumulation in the 
same spirit as in Lucas (1988) and we assume a closed economy with homogeneous agents. In 
this model we focus on the social planner case because we want to check how the distribution 
of public resources in the different sectors of the economy, by a benevolent social planner, 
affects the allocation of human between different sectors in the presence of corruption.6 In our 
economy the total public expenditures are given as: t Ht YtG G G= +  where ( )HtG  is the public 
expenditure on education and ( )YtG  is the public expenditure on other activities but mainly 
on infrastructure, 7  whereas  ( ) ( ) and Ht Ht t Yt Yt ts G G s G G= =  are the shares of public 
                                                 
5 One may argue that the higher the public expenditure on education the more educated can be the 
population and there exists appropriate environment for research but the opposition to this argument is 
that corruption does not leave space for the private sector of the economy to innovate since any 
investment becomes very costly.  
6 In this paper we speak about bureaucratic corruption and not about corruption at political level.  
7 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) provide empirical evidence that in a corrupted environment the public 
expenditure on education is high but the public expenditure on operations and maintenance is low 
which leads into a lower productivity of public capital.  Also by looking at the data the countries which 
belong to above the average level of corruption (the average corruption is 2.22 according to the 
corruption index) have on average 0.1658 as a share of public expenditure on education where on the 
contrary countries with low level of corruption have on average 0.1454 as a share of public expenditure 
on education. This can be due to the fact that the public expenditures for education (mainly salaries for 
teachers-professors) cannot be used easily by corrupted bureaucrats. 
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expenditures on total public expenditures which are used in education and final output 
respectively. A constraint is: 1Ht Yts s+ = . Corrupted bureaucrats
8 which are exogenous to the 
model are able to steal a fraction ( )1 Htsζ−  from the education sector and ( )1 Ytsδ−  from 
the final output sector with ( ), 0,1δ ζ ∈  . Therefore, after corruption, the public expenditure 
which is available for the education sector is Htsζ  and that in the final output sector is Ytsδ . 
At a more general level of the analysis we assume that the corruption level is different 
between sectors.9  In our economy households take into account the actions of corrupted 
bureaucrats when they choose how to allocate their human capital but corruption in our model 
is exogenous and we do not analyze the incentives of bureaucrats to be corrupted and 
therefore how corruption appeared in the first place. Furthermore, we assume no population 
growth and as such the aggregate and per capita variables coincide. The fraction of human 
capital which enters into the education sector is:  
( )1 /t Ht t Htu H H f sζ= =     (1) 
The fraction of human capital which enters into the production of final output sector is: 
 
( ) ( )( )2 / 1t Yt t Yt Htu H H g s g sδ δ= = = −        (2) 
According to the equation (1) if more public resources after the effect of corruption on them 
are attributed to the education sector, the higher will be the quality of education and agents 
will invest more on education. On the contrary if more public resources after the effect of 
corruption on them are attributed to the final output sector agents have the incentive to 
participate on this sector in order to acquire income through their wages.10  
                                                 
8 Bureaucrats are useful in providing public goods. We assume that there is no a detection mechanism 
of corruption, but that corruption exists only exogenously in different levels between countries. We 
make this assumption because we want to check the effect of corruption on the human capital 
accumulation and not to lead our analysis on the formation of corruption.  
9 If someone considers the corruption which affects the private sector of the economy not only as an 
expropriation of public funds which are available for the final output sector but also as a demand for 
bribes in order firms to operate, then it should be expected. ( ) ( )1  < 1- ζ δ− .   By looking at the data 
countries with corruption level above the average face lower physical capital investment than to 
countries with lower corruption (for highly corrupted countries the average growth rate of physical 
capital is 0.026 and for the low corrupted countries is 0.028). 
10 For example, according to the data both Greece and Italy face very high corruption above the average 
which happens in the private sector mainly (the average investment in Greece is 0.021 and in Italy 
0.019, where the average public expenditure in Greece is 0.08 and 0.095 in Italy), even though they 
both realize high enrollment rates and average years of schooling in their population.  
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An assumption which guarantees a simultaneous determination of Hts  and tγ  in the 
balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP)11 is that the functions ( )Htf sζ and ( )( )1 Htg sδ −
are monotonic and therefore invertible functions, which agrees with the constraint of the 
allocation of human capital across sectors: ( ) ( ) 1Ht Ytf s g sζ δ+ = .12 An extra assumption 
which verifies that the Hamiltonian corresponds to a maximization problem is that the 
function ( )Htf sζ  is concave ( )" 0Htf sζ <   . This assumption implies that individuals can 
postpone working by entering into education but this cannot be a situation which lasts for 
long period, since they need to find a job. From the constraint ( ) ( ) 1Ht Ytf s g sζ δ+ = , the 
concavity of ( )Htf sζ  implies that ( )Ytg sδ  is convex. 13  In order ( )Htf sζ  to be both 
concave and monotonic increasing we need to assume that ( )Htf sζ  is bounded from above, 
which means: for ( ) max1 1 1Hts f fζ →  → <  and similarly, ( ) max1 1 1Yts g gδ →  → < . 
Moreover, we need ( ) ( )0 0 and 0 0f g> >  in order always to have allocation of human 
capital across sectors, even if corruption is zero or at a maximum level or even if an economy 
has public expenditures or not. It can be shown that an extra necessary condition in order the 
solution of the Hamiltonian function to correspond to a maximum is that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )21 ' 1 1 " 1Ht Ht Htg s g s g sα δ δ δ − − > − −    . 14   The social planner indirectly 
affects the distribution of human capital among sectors through the functions ( )Htf sζ and 
( )Ytg sδ  by deciding on Hts  and taking as given the level of corruption. The restrictions for 
defining well the problem are the followings:  
( )1 2 2 11 1 1t t t t Htu u u u f sζ+ =  = − = −      (3) 
( ) ( ) 1Ht Ytf s g sζ δ+ =        (4) 
( ) ( ) ( ), 0,1Ht Ytf s g sζ δ ∈       (5) 
                                                 
11 The simultaneous determination of the endogenous an d  Hs γ is shown in Proposition 4. 12  These functions ( ) ( ) a n d  H t Y tf s g sζ δ  guarantee always that 1 2 1t tu u+ = . The same can 
happen even if these two functions are linear and corruption is similar between the two sectors
( )fo r  in s ta n c e , = = 0 .5δ ζ . For example if  ( ) ( )=  a n d  H t H t Y t Y tf s s g s sζ ε ζ δ η δ= , with  and  ε η  to be important scaling parameters, then: ( )1 2 0 .5 0 .5t t Y tu u sε η ε+ = + − can be equal 
to one for specific values of the scaling parameters. We prefer not to use this notation in order to keep 
the analysis as much general as we can. Furthermore, with our formulation we can account better for the 
existence of non-linearities in the relationship between corruption and human capital. 
13 The intuition behind these two assumptions is that the final output sector (private sector of the 
economy) has the capacity to absorb more individuals in comparison to the education sector.  
14 The above assumptions can be replicated if we consider a logistic functional form for ( )Ytg sδ . The 
general functional form can be: ( ) ( )1/1 e YtsYtg s δδ −= + . In this case it can be easily proved that: ( )g ' 0, g" 0, 0 0 g> > > and the condition for maximization of the Hamiltonian function is satisfied as 
well. 
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   ' 0 , g ' 0f > >  and , g f are bounded and invertible functions            (6) 
In this economy the human capital accumulation is given by: 
( )( )tt Ht Kt t Ht t Kt tH H H H f s H Hσ ϕγ σ ζ ϕγ• •= +  = +                        (7) 
with ( )HtH  being the level of human capital which is allocated into the education sector and 
its fraction into that sector is equal to: ( )/Ht t HtH H f sζ= . The parameter 0σ >  represents 
the productivity of education sector and 0ϕ <  indicates that the growth rate of physical 
capital acts as a factor which increases the demand for less educated agents.15 The reason we 
use Kγ  instead of tK
•
 is in order to have in the steady state both types of public expenditure. 
Suppose for simplicity that ( )Ht Htf s sζ εζ≡  with ( )ε to be a positive scaling parameter. 
Then equation (7) can be written as:   tHt Hts Kγ σεζ ϕ
•
= +  which is equal to 
( ) ( )/ / tHt Hts Kγ σεζ ϕ σεζ
•
= − , which together with the condition ( )0 K ttK K eγ=  gives us: 
( ) ( )/ /Ht Ht Kt ts Kγ σεζ ϕ σεζ γ= −  . By differentiating the last expression with respect to 
time we can get: ( )( )2/Ht Kt tds dt Kϕ σεζ γ= − . Then by taking the limit as t → +∞ for 
0ϕ <  we get 1Hs =  and for 0ϕ > , 0Hs = . We would like to avoid these two extreme cases.  
The social planner, by deciding on Hts  together with the exogenous level of corruption, 
can affect the decisions of individuals on how to allocate their human capital between 
different sectors.  Therefore, we consider an economy in which the social planner chooses 
consumption goods, how much to invest in physical capital and how to allocate public 
expenditure between sectors by taking into account that this choice affects indirectly the 
allocation of human capital between sectors.16  
The production function of the economy at the aggregate level is the following:  
                                1t Yt tY H K
α α−
=                                                          (8)                              
                                                 
15 In this paper, the productivity of human capital is positively related with physical capital by looking 
at the production function in equation (8). However, we maintain that the accumulation of human 
capital is negatively related to the physical capital investment because physical capital requires more 
raw labour than skilled one.   
16 The novelty of this paper is that individuals decide on how to allocate their human capital by taking  
into account what is the real amount of public resources distributed into different sectors, (this role 
played by the functions ( )H tf sζ and ( )Y tg sδ .  In the literature the public expenditure is used as a 
variable that affects the quality of education sector and not the allocation of human capital in different 
sectors, see for example Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) among others. With the current formulation 
implicitly we capture the possibility of people avoiding investing more on education due to a reduction 
of its quality.  
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The accumulation of physical capital is:  
                   t t t tK Y G C
•
= − −                                                     (9)  
By following Barro (1990) we consider a balanced budget constraint for government and 
implement the following condition: t Ht Yt tG G G Yτ= + =     
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 (1 )t Yt t t Ht t t tK H K C g s H K Cαα α α ατ τ δ
•
− −
= − − = −  −  −               (10) 
In this model, we consider that both YtG  and HtG  appear implicitly and indirectly on the 
production function and on the equation of human capital accumulation through the terms 
/Yt Yt ts G G=  and /Ht Ht ts G G=  respectively. This is a simplification assumption which is 
very useful in order to analyze purely the allocation of human capital among sectors due to 
the existence of corruption. Moreover, for simplicity we assume a zero depreciation rate for 
both human and physical capital and we consider the taxation ( )τ to be constant over time.17   
The instantaneous utility function of the representative agent is: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t tU C C θ θ−= − − , with 0θ >  to be the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution.  So the social planner has to maximize the following problem: 
{ } 0
1
0, , ,
1
1t H t t t
tt
C s H K
CMax U e dt
θ
ρ
θ+∞
=
−
+∞
−
 −
≡  
−  , 0ρ > ; 0θ >                     (11) 
s.t.: ( )( )t Ht t Kt tH f s H Hσ ζ ϕγ• = + ,   0σ > ;   [ ]0,1f ∈ , t∀                    (12) 
          ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 (1 )t Yt t t Ht t t tK H K C g s H K Cαα α α ατ τ δ
•
− −
= − − = −  −  −   t∀           (13) 
along with the transversality conditions (TVC): 
                                                 
17 In this model we are not interested in optimal taxation and we do not make any assumption on 
possible effects of corruption on taxes. For example an important paper for tax evasion and corruption 
is that of Been-Lon Chen (2003). More literature on the connection between corruption and tax 
structure, see among others Fisman and Svensson (2007), Gordon and Li (2009), and Litina and Palivos 
(2011).  Furthermore we avoid from the analysis to use total public expenditures because we are not 
interested in the optimal public size. For this literature see Johnson et al. (1999) and Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997).   
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 lim 0t tt Hλ→∞ =   and  lim 0t tt Kμ→∞ =     (14) 
and the initial conditions: ( ) ( )H 0 0 and K 0 0 given.> >                (15) 
For notational simplicity we avoid the time subscripts and we define the following current 
value Hamiltonian function that the social planner has to maximize: 
{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
, , ,
1 1 (1 )
1H H K HC s H K
CMax J f s H g s H K C
θ
α α αλ σ ζ ϕγ μ τ δ
θ
−
−
−    = + + + −  −  −     
−
 (16)   
Definition:  
BALANCED GROWTH PATH (BGP) EQUILIBRIUM 
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) equilibrium in this economy is a framework where: 
i)  All time-dependent variables grow at a constant possibly positive exponential 
rate;  
ii) The ratio of the two endogenous state variables, Kt/Ht, remains invariant over 
time.18 
2.2  BGP Analysis 
Proposition 1  
Along the BGP equilibrium, we have: 
  
( )
1
Hf sσ ζγ
ϕ
  
=
−
           with 1 ϕ ≠ for >0γ    (17) 
Proof: It follows by considering H Kγ γ γ= =  in the equation of human capital 
accumulation. 
                                                 
18 This assumption will lead in the long run in the coexistence of the two forms of capital in the 
aggregate production function. If for example physical capital grows faster than human capital then in 
the long run (ݐ → +∞)   human capital will become infinitely small relative to physical capital  
something which against the current empirical evidence which is that both physical capital increases 
with some fluctuations over time and human capital increases monotonically over time for the most of 
the countries.  
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The next proposition shows the growth rate of the economy described by using all the 
appropriate FOCS and the result of equation (17). 
Proposition 2  
Along the BGP equilibrium, we have: 
 
( )( )
( )
1
1
H
Y C H K
f sσ ζ θ ϕ ργ γ γ γ γ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
  − + 
= = = = = +
−
,                                (18) 
Proof: For the derivations of this expression see Appendix A.   
 
The next proposition shows first of all under what conditions the growth rate from equation 
(18) is positive and secondly that <0d
d
γ
ρ
, <0d
d
γ
θ
and the TVC holds. 
Proposition 3  
Along the BGP equilibrium, we have: 
For  >0; <0d
d
γγ
ρ
 and <0 d
d
γ
θ
, we need  0,  1-  fϕ ϕ θ< >   and 
( )( )
( )
1
< 
1
Hf sσ ϕ ζ θρ
ϕ
− −   
−
. The TVC always holds.  
Proof: It follows immediately from Eq. (18).19   
 
The parameter restriction of 0,ϕ <  is important for the model, otherwise if 0,ϕ >  then in 
case that an economy is very impatient (high values ρ  of and θ  ), then the growth rate of the 
economy will be negative, 0K H Yγ γ γ↓ ↓  < . 
The next proposition shows that there exists simultaneously an endogenous growth rate 
( )γ  and an endogenous share of public expenditure on education ( )Hs .  
                                                 
19 In this proposition it is shown formally that 0ϕ < , which supports the idea that the increase of the 
physical capita investment (ߛ௄) provides extra incentives for individuals to enter into the labour market 
force which is the same in this model as to allocate more human capital into the final output sector. This 
result is driven by the model assumption that (Kt/Ht) is invariant over time together with the other main 
assumption that human capital investment is intensive on time and not on output resources which 
reduce the available income for savings. This assumption can be true in an environment in which public 
education is the main type of education. 
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Proposition 4  
Along the BGP equilibrium, we have a simultaneous determined value for ( )γ ∗  and for ( )Hs∗
given by: 
 ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )1
 
1
1
 and 1
1
H
H Y
f
f s
s s
ϕ ϕγ σ ρζ
σ ζ θ ϕ σθργ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ζ
∗
−
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
   − + −   − 
− +      
= + − = = 
−    
   (19) 
respectively, when we have { }and  σ ρ ρ ϕ σ> − > ,which is always true iff 0ϕ < , and 
0 <ρ σ γ
ϕ
 −
<    .  
Proof:  The proof is in the Appendix A. The important assumption for this proof is that the 
function ( )Hf sζ  is invertible.   
 
The next proposition shows the effect of corruption in the growth rate of the economy.20 
Proposition 5  
( )
' 0,  
1
Yg sd
d
σ θγ
δ ϕ ϕ= − >− for  ( ) 0,1  Ys
∗ ∈ and  Ys
∗ to be constant in BGP ; ' 0,  g > and 0,ϕ <
which means ( ) 01
d
d
γ
δ <− , and for ( ) 0,1Hs
∗ ∈  and  Hs
∗ to be constant in BGP ' 0,  f > and 
0,ϕ <  which means ( ) 01
d
d
γ
ζ >− .  
 
Proof: This result follows from differentiating equation (18) with respect to δ  and ζ
respectively.  
 
First of all, we explain the effect of corruption on economic growth when corruption happens 
in the public expenditure for the final output sector.   
                                                 
20  Corruption is assumed throughout the paper that can be different between the two sectors and 
therefore in Proposition 5 we measure the effect of each type of corruption into the growth rate of the 
economy. 
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The above analysis indicates that due to the parameter restriction , the increase of 
Hγ is smaller than the decrease of Kγ , and therefore the total effect of corruption on 
economic growth is negative. The intuition behind this is that when corruption is too high in 
the final output sector more human capital is allocated to the education sector but the total 
economy shrinks so much that there is a fall in demand for both high and low skilled workers. 
Hence, individuals do not have any incentive to postpone working by entering into the 
education sector.21  
Now, we provide an explanation about the effect of corruption on economic growth when 
corruption happens in the public expenditure on education. This can be seen as a situation 
where corruption reduces the quality of education but the private sector of the economy is not 
affected and there is demand for labor force educated, or not.   
Hence, the lower the corruption in the final output sector, the higher economic growth will 
be. Furthermore, the higher the corruption in the education sector, the lower the detrimental 
effect of corruption on economic growth will be.  
3  Analytical Framework  
In this section, we explain what the main equation we estimate is and how it arrives from the 
theoretical model. Here we introduce a flexible way to allow for a link between corruption 
and hits  and
k
itγ  respectively by allowing corruption to be the main determinant of their 
regression coefficient. In that context we use a flexible semi-parametric econometric model 
that allows for an unknown smooth coefficient function of corruption for both hits  and
k
itγ  to 
capture a potentially different effect of corruption among sectors.  The equation we are going 
to estimate for human capital accumulation is:  ( ) ( )h h kit it it it itf corrup s g corrupγ γ= + .where 
( )itf corrup  is the coefficient of hits  estimated non-parametrically as a function of 
corruption, and ( )itg corrup  is the coefficient of kitγ  estimated non-parametrically as a 
function of corruption. The main point of this specification is that it captures simultaneously 
the two effects of corruption into the economy: i) the distortion in the allocation of public 
expenditure (our interest is for public expenditure on education) and ii) the harm of corruption 
in the physical capital investment since it`s more expensive to accumulate physical capital 
when corruption is high.  
 
                                                 
21 The most possible scenario in a situation like this is for individuals to work in the unofficial sector of 
the economy, but this is something that the model does not intend to capture. An important paper of this 
direction is the paper of Sarte (2000). 
[ ]0ϕ <
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4  Data, Estimation Method and Empirical Results  
4.1  Data 
The main equation of interest that we want to estimate is the following:  
( ) ( )1 1 1 20 1 2
1 1 1 1
N Z T
h k h
it i i j j t t s sit it it it it it
i j t s
a a D a D a D b X corrup corrup s uγ θ γ θ
− − −
= = = =
= + + + + + + +      (20) 
( iD ) is a group dummy separating the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, and          
( jD ) is a region dummy in order to capture specific characteristics of sub-Saharan, Latin 
America and Eastern-European countries which were in transition during the period of our 
sample. The data are averaged over 5 years for the following periods: 1995-1999, 2000-2004 
and 2005-2010. We use time-specific dummy ( tD ) in order to avoid business cycle effects.  
The vector of ( sitX ) consists of two control variables that are used later in order to examine 
the robustness of our results. These two variables are infant mortality (infmort) and political 
stability (polstab). The former affects human capital accumulation in the fertility and growth 
literature and as Gupta et al. (2000) and Rajkumar et al. (2008) argue, it is also affected by 
corruption due to the low public investment in health services. The latter variable captures the 
general political framework where corruption can thrive and have an important effect on 
human capital.22  The data for infant mortality (infmort) come from the United Nations dataset 
(2010) and it is expressed as deaths per 1000 births. The data for political stability (polstab) 
come from the work of Kaufmann et al. (2010). 23 
As it was mentioned earlier the growth rate of physical capital ( kitγ ) or alternatively 
physical capital investment is worsened by corruption and similarly is the public expenditure 
on education as a share of total public expenditures ( hits ).
24 Our main goal is to check the two 
effects of corruption through the two variables ( kitγ ) and ( hits ) on human capital accumulation 
simultaneously by allowing these effects to be non-linear and variable over time and for 
different group of countries. The two unknown functions ( )1 itcorrupθ  and ( )2 itcorrupθ  
depend on the level of corruption and are estimated by a smooth coefficient semi-parametric 
model.25 The difference of this method with OLS in which  corruption affects directly and 
linearly human capital accumulation is that now we assume that both of the coefficients of       
( kitγ ) and ( hits ) vary directly with the level of corruption. In that way, since countries have 
                                                 
22 Mo (2001) finds that in countries with high corruption there exists higher political instability. The 
index of political stability has been used as a control variable of corruption by Bjørnskov (2003).  
23 The higher values of this index correspond to less political instability. 
24 For the negative impact of corruption on physical capital investment see the paper of Mauro (1995).  
25 For details of the method for the smooth coefficient see Fan (1992) and Fan and Zhang (1999), Li et 
al (2002) and  Mamuneas et al. (2006) among others.  
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different levels of corruption it is expected that the effect of ( kitγ ) and ( hits ) not to be constant 
across countries and time.   
Other data-related points that we want to stress are: First of all, the data for public 
expenditure on education as a share of total public expenditures come from the United 
Nations dataset (2010). This variable includes government spending on educational 
institutions (both public and private), educational administration as well as subsidies for 
private entities. It is expressed as a percentage. The variable of the growth rate of physical 
capital ( kitγ ) is constructed by using data from Heston et al. (2011). .26 Finally the data for 
corruption are obtained from the database of Kaufmann et al. (2010). This variable is defined 
in such a way as to capture the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain. The original scores range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better outcome.27 For human capital accumulation ( hitγ ), which is the dependent variable, 
we use enrollment rates for population aged between 25 and 65 years. The data for this 
variable come from the Barro–Lee (2010) dataset. The Barro–Lee (2010) dataset has been 
extensively used in recent years and as such allows us to make direct comparisons with other 
empirical studies that explore the role of human capital in economic growth.28 
Finally, due to the possible existence of endogeneity bias which stems from the fact that 
corruption may relate to human capital in a two-way causality pattern, we also use an 
instrumental variable approach. Aidt et al. (2008) used the index of voice and accountability 
(voaac) as an instrument of corruption, variable which is also obtained from the Kaufmann et 
al. (2010) dataset. Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
                                                 
26  For the construction of ( )1kit t t tk k kγ += − , we have used the following formula: ( ), , 1 ,1i t i t i tk k Iδ−= − + . We have set 0.06δ = which is standard in the literature. The initial value for 
physical capital has been constructed by 
0 0, ,i t i t
k Y α= , where α  takes the value 2 but we have tried 
different values around 2 and the results are the same and available upon request. ,i tI  is the total 
investment at 2005 constant prices, and ,i tY   is the real GDP (Laspeyres), at 2005 constant prices. We 
have also used data for population in thousands from the same data base.  Then we average the 
constructed series of kitγ  in the following intervals: 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2010. 27 In order higher values of the index to represent higher corruption we have transformed the data 
according to the following formula: corruption=2.5-corruption [Index]. 
28 We use total human capital, which is the sum of primary, secondary and higher education. This is 
done for two major reasons. Firstly, non-OECD countries exhibit very small participation rates at higher 
levels of education. Finally, because in every country participation at primary and secondary level of 
education is a necessary requirement in order for people to proceed into higher levels of schooling, we 
believe it is preferable to include also primary and secondary education in our measure of human 
capital. We have estimated our results for different categories of human capital and the non-linearities 
still appear and are even stronger in the tertiary level of education.  These results are not presented here 
but are available upon request. Moreover, according to de la Fuente and Domenech (2006), the stock 
measure of human capital (total mean years of schooling data) suffer from serious measurement error 
problems, something that would be exacerbated if we were to obtain growth rates from differencing the 
stock series. Hence, instead of measuring human capital accumulation in growth rates as it is the case 
for per-capita income, we prefer to use enrollment rates instead. 
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country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free press. The higher the value of this index, the 
higher is the quality of institutions. We first proceed to perform a test of endogeneity,29 and 
we do not find any evidence for its presence. However, we still proceed to follow a two stage 
least squares approach using the instrument mentioned above in order to compare the results 
with the case when we ignore the possibility of endogeneity. The first stage in the two stage 
approach that uses the following equation 
( ), , , , ,k hit i j t it it itcorrup f D D D s voaccγ=                                     (21) 
This is an OLS regression which includes all the exogenous variables and dummies plus the 
instrument which is the variable of voice and accountability (voacc). Then this regression 
provides us with fitted values for corruption ( corrup
∧
) which is the new index that we can use 
now for corruption in the second stage of the analysis. We will then compare the results from 
the two approaches, using corrupt and corrup
∧
to see how the results differ, if they differ at 
all. Given that our test failed to detect the presence of endogeneity we expect that the two sets 
of results will not differ by much 
Now we provide a quick exposition of the semi-parametric method of smooth coefficients. 
Equation (20) in a more compact form becomes: 
  ( ) ( )1 2h k hit it it it it it itcorrup corrup s uγ β θ γ θ= Ψ + + +                       (22) 
where ( ), , ,it i j t sitD D D XΨ = , sitX  is the vector of the two control variables (polstab 
,infmort) which are used for robustness check, and the error term satisfies 
( ), , , 0.k hit it it it itE u corrup sγΨ =  We define ( ), ,k hi t it itz sγ=  and  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2[ , ].it it itcorrup corrup corrupν θ θ=  The most important is to estimate ( )1 itcorrupθ  
and ( )2 itcorrupθ . In the first step the variables of the linear part are projected off the other 
variables to produce the new redefined variables and then this leads to the usual local least 
square method but the choice of the Kernel function is determined by the variable of 
 
 
                                                 
29 The Prob>chi2 value of Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test for endogeneity is 0.3724 which means that the 
initial hypothesis for the absence of correlation between “corruption” and the error term is not rejected, 
which means that there is no endogeneity bias of corruption. For the Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test for 
endogeneity see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Enrollment on Education 0.814791 0.2195798 0.169 1 
Public Expenditure on 
Education 0.156871 0.049196 0.064158 0.346889 
Physical Capital Investment 0.027337 0.028283 -0.045330 0.141158 
Corruption 2.222165 1.049657 -0.0101107 3.882736 
Voice and Accountability 0.240575 0.934729 -1.802832 1.65263 
Political Stability. 0.049254 0.904495 -2.351705 1.630576 
 
corruption ( )itcorrup : ( ) ( ) ,i thit it itcorrup z uγ ν∗ ∗ ∗= + . Once ( )itcorrupν is estimated we 
project back to redefine ( )hitγ and we run a linear regression to estimate β . It is a generalized 
method of varying coefficient models and it is based on local polynomial regression.30  
We use a standard multivariate kernel density estimator with Gaussian kernel and the rule 
of thumb suggested by Silverman (1986) as the choice of the bandwidth. The non-parametric 
element of equation (22) will be examined graphically. Finally, we have performed the Hsiao 
et al. (2007) test in order to check if the linear model is well specified or alternatively to use a 
more flexible non-parametric model such as the smooth coefficient method described above. 
In Table 1 above are the summary statistics for the variables we use and in Appendix B is the 
list of countries. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
In column A of Table 2, there are the OLS results when we use the corruption index directly 
without the use of any control variable. From this table we observe that all the main variables 
of interest enter negatively and corruption moreover is statistically significant using robust 
standard errors.31 In column B of Table 2, we use the new index of corruption from the first 
  
                                                 
30  For taking into account the equivalence between the smooth coefficient method and the local 
polynomial method see among others, Stone (1977), Fan (1992), and Gozalo and Linton (2000). 
31 In the paper of Lin (1998), someone can find a theoretical justification how an increase in public 
expenditure on education can lead into a reduction in the incentive of individual to accumulate human 
capital. 
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Table 2: Empirical Results 
 OLS OLS OLS 
Variables  (A) (B) (C) 
constant 1.067*** (0.052) 
1.149*** 
(0.070) 
1.065*** 
(0.042) 
oecd 0.036 (0.021) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.024 
(0.013) 
la 0.148*** (0.024) 
0.143*** 
(0.024) 
0.106*** 
(0.020) 
af -0.136*** (0.040) 
-0.136*** 
(0.043) 
0.153*** 
(0.042) 
tran 0.169*** (0.022) 
0.123*** 
(0.022) 
0.053*** 
(0.021) 
d00 -0.082** (0.022) 
-0.084*** 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
d05 -0.036 (0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.018) 
pubexp -0.068 (0.259) 
-0.171 
(0.284) 
-0.305 
(0.193) 
gk -0.777* (0.398) 
-0.911*** 
(0.405) 
-1.060*** 
(0.411) 
corruption -0.096*** (0.012) 
-0.116*** 
(0.020) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
polstab - - -0.012 (0.015) 
infmort - - -0.006*** (0.000) 
R2/R2adj. 58.15/56.54 54.25/52.49 73.08/71.81 
Observations 244 244 244 
F-test 36.13*** 30.38*** 57.27*** 
Heteroskedasticity 105.13*** 94.33*** 136.91*** 
( )P Specific.  2.22e-16*** 2.22e-16*** 2.22e-16*** 
Notes: ***,** and * denote the 1%,5% and 10% significance level. 
Heteroskedasticity is present by conducting Breusch-Pagan test. In the parentheses 
are the robust standard errors. Pubexp is the public expenditure on education as a 
share of total public expenditure, and gk is the growth rate of physical capital. 
P(Specific) shows the p-values if the null of the parametric linear OLS is correctly 
specified in comparison to a fully non-parametric model, using the Hsiao et al. 
(2007) test for continuous and discrete data models after 399 Boostrap replications. 
stage in order to compare these results with those of using the corruption index directly. The 
results are qualitative similar with those in column A. Finally, in column C of Table 2, there 
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are the results with the inclusion of the two control variables (political stability and infant 
mortality). The results are quantitatively similar both in OLS and in the semi-parametric 
framework. 32  Moreover, the results of Hsiao et al. (2007) test suggest that the linear 
specification is rejected. 
In order to see the smooth coefficient semi-parametric results, we proceed to the graphical 
analysis.  According to Figure 1, in low levels of corruption where the more developed 
countries belong, a marginal increase of corruption leads into a positive effect of  public 
expenditure as a share of total public expenditure ( hits ) on human capital accumulation. In 
general the impact of public expenditure on education is positive but decreasing for high 
levels of corruption. A possible explanation is that when corruption is small a further increase 
of it will not prevent individuals from acquiring education if the private sector is not affected 
by corruption. On the contrary if corruption increases too much then the effect of it on the 
quality of education is big enough in order the individuals to lose their incentives to invest on 
education. 
In the case where we check for the impact of physical capital growth ( kitγ ) on human 
capital accumulation, Figure 2 still suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship. In low 
levels of corruption, where countries are more developed, an increase of corruption has 
negative but small impact on the coefficient of kitγ  on human capital accumulation. However, 
for higher levels of corruption the impact of kitγ  on human capital investment is negative and 
more severe. Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the smooth coefficient semi-parametric results 
when we use the instrumented index of corruption. 33  The main conclusion from the 
econometric analysis is that the impact of corruption on human capital is smaller through its 
effect on the public expenditure on education than through its effect on the physical capital 
investment something which consistent with the model and gives rise into the importance of 
private sector.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Even if the variable of political stability is not statistically significant it is important to mention that 
by including this variable as a control variable the non-linearities are prevalent but in countries with 
high corruption and high political instability the negative effect of public expenditure on education is 
more severe.  The semi-parametric results for the control variables are not presented here but are 
available upon request.  
33 From a direct comparison of Figure 3 and 4 with Figure 1 and 2 respectively, it is easily observed that 
the results do not change when we have instrumented for corruption. 
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Figure 1: The Marginal Effect of Public Expenditure on Education on Human Capital 
Accumulation 
 
Figure  2: The Marginal Effect of the Growth rate of Physical Capital on Human Capital 
Accumulation 
 
 
Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Public Expenditure on Education on Human Capital 
Accumulation with Instrumented Corruption 
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Figure  4: The Marginal Effect of the Growth rate of Physical Capital on Human Capital 
Accumulation with Instrumented Corruption 
 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we propose an endogenous growth model where corruption, which is considered 
as an exogenous variable, can potentially reduce public resources for the different sectors of 
the economy. This creates a distortion in the allocation of human capital across sectors since 
one of the main assumptions of our model is that individuals decide on how to allocate their 
human capital between sectors by considering the net (from corruption) amount of public 
resources. At the same time another important assumption is that the higher is the investment 
on physical capital, which is different from technological progress, the higher is the demand 
for individuals with less human capital, and therefore physical capital investment reduces the 
investment on education. If corruption affects mainly public expenditure on education then 
the private sector of economy grows and offset the possible negative effects of corruption on 
the accumulation of human capital. On the contrary, if corruption affects mainly the private 
sector of the economy, individuals can postpone participating on the labor force by investing 
on more education but since there is low demand both for high and low level of human capital 
then the growth rate of the economy is going to fall.  
     In the empirical section of the paper we use a semi-parametric smooth coefficient 
model in order to capture possible differential effect of corruption on the important elements 
of human capital. The empirical results suggest the existence of non-linearities between 
corruption and human capital accumulation. More specifically, corruption has a declining but 
positive effect on the coefficient of the public expenditure on education, but it has mainly a 
negative effect on the coefficient of physical capital. This intuitively means that even if 
physical capital investment has by itself a negative effect on human capital due to corruption 
this effect becomes more severe because the economy shrinks too much and there are no 
incentives to invest on education anymore. 
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     To conclude, corruption has negative impact on human capital accumulation. However, 
as a result even if the investment on physical capital does not stimulate incentives for more 
education, corruption should be confronted, otherwise there is a reduction both on human and 
physical capital accumulation which will affect negatively economic growth. From a policy 
perspective achieving a higher score in educational attainment does not translate always into 
higher growth if corruption is a dominant practice in the economy. These results suggest that 
it would be of a paramount importance for governments to establish policy practices that 
reduce corruption in the first place before attaining higher standards in other wellbeing 
measurements such as education. 
Appendix  A:  Equations (17) – (19) 
The current value  Hamiltonian is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
11 1 (1 )
1 H K H
CJ f s H g s H K C
θ
α α αλ σ ζ ϕγ μ τ δ
θ
−
−
−  
= +  +  + −  −  −    
−
  
In the Hamiltonian function written above and CHs  are the control variables and  and KH  
are the state variables. The necessary first order conditions read as: 
10  J CC
C C
θ μμ
θ μ
• •
−
∂
= ⇔ =  = −
∂
        (A1) 
( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1
0  
' H= 1 (1 ) (1 ) '
H
H H H
J
s
f s g s g s H K
α α αλσ ζ ζ μα τ δ δ δ− −
∂
= ⇔
∂
⇔ −  −  − 
   (A2)  
( )( ) ( )1 1 (1 )HJ g s H KK
α α αμ μρ μρ μ τ α δ
•
−
∂
= − = − − −  −  ∂          (A3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 11 (1 )H K HJ f s g s H KH
α α αλ λρ λρ λ σ ζ ϕγ μα τ δ• − −∂  = − = −   + − −  −     ∂   (A4)    
Divide (A3) with μ :  
( )( ) ( )1 1 (1 )Hg s H Kα α αμ ρ τ α δμ
•
−
= − − −  −     (A3’) 
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With ( )(1 )Hg sδ −  to be constant in BGP in order μμ
•
 to be constant as well in BGP, we 
need: 
K H
K H
γ
• •
= =      (A3’’)    
Divide (A4) with λ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 11 (1 )H K Hf s g s H Kα α αλ μρ σ ζ ϕγ α τ δλ λ
•
− − = −   + − −  −                (A4’) 
Log-linearize and differentiate (A2) with respect to time: ( )1  H H K
H H K
λ μ
α αλ μ
• • • • •
+ = + + −  
and, using (A3’’):  
λ μ
λ μ
• •
=       (A2’) 
 
We solve (A2) with respect to :μλ  
( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1
'
1 (1 ) (1 ) '
H
H H
f s
g s g s H K
α α α
σ ζ ζμ
λ α τ δ δ δ− − −
=
−  −  − 
  (A2’’) 
By replacing (A2’’) into (A4’) we get, after some algebra:  
( ) ( )(1 )H K Hf s g sλ ρ σ ζ ϕγ σ δλ
•
 = −   + −  −         (A4’’)  
which is constant in BGP.  
We then equate (A4’’) with (A3’) and solve with respect to
( )(1 )
 H
g s H
K
αδ  −     
: 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )( ) ( )( )
(1 ) (1 )
1 1 1 1
H H H K K
g s H f s g s
K
αδ σ ζ δ ϕγ σ ϕγ
α τ α τ
  −  + − + + 
= =  
− − − − 
     (A5) 
since ( ) ( )(1 ) 1H Hf s g sζ δ+ − =  by definition. 
From the constraint of human capital and (A3’’) we get:  
( )
1
Hf sσ ζγ
ϕ
  
=
−
 with 1ϕ ≠  and <1ϕ , for >0γ   (A6) 
From the definition of BGP and from (A3’’) together with (A6), K
K
γ
•
=  is constant iff:   
C K H
C K H
γ
• • •
= = =                     (A7) 
By inserting (A3’) into (A1), equating the resulting expression with (A6) and then solving 
with respect to 
( )(1 )Hg s H
K
αδ  −     
, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
(1 ) 1
1 1 1
H Hg s H f s
K
αδ σ ζ θ ρ ϕ
ϕ τ α
  −    + −   
=  
− − − 
   (A8) 
Then by equating expression (A5) with (A8) we get: 
( )( )
( )
1
1
Hf sσ ζ θ ϕ ργ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
  − + 
= +
−
    (A9)    
In order for  <0 d
d
γ
ρ
and <0d
d
γ
θ
 we need 0ϕ <  and for 0d
d
γ
σ
>  we need ( )1- Hf sϕ θ ζ>    
and for 0γ >  we need 
( )( )
( )
1
1
Hf sϕ ζ θρ σ
ϕ
− −   
<
−
. 
We now check the two transversality conditions: lim 0t tt Hλ→∞ =  and lim 0t tt Kμ→∞ = . Because 
of (A2’) and (A7) if the transversality condition holds for the one state variable it holds for 
the other as well. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )lim 0 0 lim 0 0 lim
H t t
Ht
t tt t t
e H H e H e
λ λρ ρ γλ λρ λ λ λ
• • •      
− + + − + +      
−    
→∞ →∞ →∞
= =  
By replacing into the previous expression (A4’’), ( )Hf sσ ζ ϕγ γ  + =  from(A6) and the 
constraint ( ) ( )(1 ) 1H Hf s g sζ δ+ − = , we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1lim 0 0 lim 0 0 lim 0H
H t
H f s tt
t tt t t
e H H e H e
λρ λ σ ζρ λ λ λ
• •  
− + +  
− −
−  
→∞ →∞ →∞
= = =  
 
since ( ) ( ) 0,1Hf sζ ∈ . 
From (A9) we have: 
( )( )
( )
 1
1
Hf sσ ζ θ ϕ ργ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
  − + 
= +
−
. Since ( )Hf sζ  is an invertible 
function by assumption, then from (A9) we get:   
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
1
11 1 H
H H H
f s
f s f s s
ϕ ϕγ σ ρ ϕ ϕγ σ ρ ζζ ζ
σθ σθ ζ
−
−
 − + − − + −
=  =  =  
 (A10)    
( )11 HH Y f ss s ζ ζζ
−
−
− = =     (A11) 
In order the expression inside the brackets in equation (A10) to be a positive number we need: 
0 0 ,ρ σϕγ σ ρ γ
ϕ
−
+ − > < < <  since 0 ϕ <  and 0σ ρ− >  as it is shown below. Since 
( )1 0,1H Ys s− = ∈  then we need 1fζ −> . Moreover we have 1 0f − > since ' >0 f and 
( )'1 0f − > as well since ( )Hf sζ  is invertible. 
From equation (A9) by using the result from (A6) we get the following result: 
 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
 1 1
1 1
H Hf s f sσ ζ θ ϕ σ ζ θ σ ϕρ ρ γθ σ ρ γθ ρ σγ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
  − +   − −
−   
= + = + = − + = +
− −
 (A9’) 
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We  define:  ( ) γθ ρ σγ ϕ ϕ
−Ψ = + ,so (A9’) becomes ( ) ( )γ γ γΩ = − Ψ . In order to exist an 
endogenous solution for γ , we need either  ( ) ( ){ }' 0 if 0 1γΨ > Ψ <  or
( ) ( ){ }' 0 if 0 1γΨ < Ψ > . 
Since, from (A8) ( )1  H Ys s − =   is constant in BGP, then ( )Hf sζ  and ( )(1 )Hg sδ −  
are constant in BGP as well.  
 We can show that ( )' 0θγ ϕΨ = <  for <0ϕ . Then we need ( )0 1Ψ > . We can show that
( )0 1ρ ϕϕ
−Ψ = > iff { }σ ρ>  and{ }ρ ϕ σ− >   which is true since 0ϕ < by assumption.  
 
If the above conditions hold then an endogenous growth rate of the economy γ ∗  exists in 
BGP and, if we replace γ ∗  inside (A10), there exists an endogenous ( )1 H Ys s∗ ∗− =  which is 
equal to: 
 ( )
( )[ ]1 1
1 H Y
f
s s
ϕ ϕγ σ ρζ
σθ
ζ
−
∗ ∗
 − + −
−   
− = = . Therefore,  γ ∗ and ( )1 H Ys s∗ ∗− = are 
determined simultaneously. 
Appendix  B 
OECD Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., 
U.S.  
Non-OECD Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’ Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),  Israel, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Ar. Emirates, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia. 
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Latin America Countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay. 
Sub-Saharan Africa Countries: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Ghana, Cote d’ Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia. 
Transition Countries:  Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic. 
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